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INDUSTRIAL COM.MISSION OF
UTAH, CREAM O'WEBER/FEDEllA TED DAIRY FARMS, INC.,
and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMP ANY,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Appellant's made claim under the \Vorkmen' s
Compensation Laws of 'the State of Utah against FedtTated Dairy Farms, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insuranee Company, its insurance carrier, for recovery of
1

death benefits allowed by said laws, based upon tn, ,·c
death of Leo L. Lundberg.
cL
[a

DISPOSITION BELOW

pl
ac

After the initial hearing below, before Robert J rE
Shaughnessy, Hearing Examiner for the Utah Indus- ti
trial Commission, an Order was entered finding that the la
decedent was not in the course of, nor did the accident
arise out of his employment. A Motion for Review wm \'
i1led by Appellants which was granted and pursuant
L
thereto an additional hearing was held. Thereafter, the.
ti
same Hearing Examiner prepared and entered Find·
sl
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment
d
to the effect that the Appellants were not entitled to
death benefits as Leo L. Lundberg, the decedent, was
not in the course of his employment at the time of his
death nor did his death arise out of his employment. A
motion for review by the Commission as a whole was
filed by Appellants, which motion, after consideration
by the Industrial Commission, was denied and the Ap·
pellants then brought this Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondents seek to have the Court affirm the de·
cision of the Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents agree in general with the State·
ment of Facts set forth by the Appellants and do not
2

tn, ,·ontend that any statements contained therein are inaccurate. However, the Statement of Facts by the Appellants tends to overstate the requirements of the employer in regard to entertainment and other extraneous
actiYities that the decedent engaged in and for that
t J reason, with the understanding that the statement conius- tained herein is to amplify the statement of the Appelthe !ants, a short statement of additional facts will be added.
lent

First, it should be noted that the Appellant was
Wholesale Sales Manager for the employer only in Salt
1anl
the Lake County and his duties did not involve any activities in any other area (RllO, 167-168, 120-121). The
.nd·
statement of the Appellants regarding the fact that his
ten I
l to duties included the entertaining of owner and executives
of his customers is somewhat in conflict with the facts
was
· as stated by his supervisors in the company. They stated
his
A that on numerous occasions, the Appellant had been
11arned that he was doing too much entertaining and
was
that the company did not require many of the things he
:ion
'ip· was doing. In fact, he was told that, among other
things, he was spending too much time on the golf course
IR17, 21-22, 154-155, 176-178). In fact, the decedent
had been criticized for not spending enough time doing
eompany work and for spending time on the golf courses
wm

de· IRI86).

Insofar as the Appellant's statement that the decedent received some phone calls from customers at
night and on weekends and his responsibility in relation
lhereto, it should be noted that normally, because he was
te· the \Vholesale Sales Manager for Salt Lake County,
not those calls were referred to subordinates of the decedent

3

known as Supervisors or were deferred for handling un
til the next day (R31-50, 122, 158) and in fact, one 01 1
the Supervisors testified that he did not know of an in a
stance when the decedent went out of his home to personally take care of a complaint he received after hour.i
(R49-50). The decedent was paid .08c per mile for the r
use of his vehicle when he was on company affairs, ex·!
eluding mileage from his home to the off ice or to his fin!
call in the morning, or from the office or his last call i11
the evening back to his home. In spite of the fact he
was entitled to mileage, the mileage records practical!),
uniformly reveal an exclusion of mileage that was being!
charged to the Company by the decedent of approxi- ·
mately 13 miles each evening and, in fact, the undisput.
able testimony of one of the witnesses who examined tht
mileage records that are a part of the record on file
herein, is that he found no indication at all of any mileage being charged during any evening. (R 152)
In relation to the memberships at the Willowcreek
Country Club and the Towne House Club, it should be
noted that the employer only paid a portion of the
monthly expenses incurred at those establishments with
the decedent paying the balance (R 153). In addition,
the decedent had a membership in a club known as the
Yacht Club for which no payment was made by the
company, either on the initial membership or the ex·
penses incurred for entertainment at that club (R 153\. ·
However, he did entertain at such club and had a mem·
bership there (R 78, 125-126, 132-133).

There is no dispute tha't the use of an automobile
was essential to the duties required of Mr. Lundberg ·
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However, as noted by the Statement of Facts by the
Appellants, approximately 50 per cent of his work was
at the company offices (R 47, 162). It should be further noted that there were always at least three vehicles
available to the decedent for his use at the company
office (R I56) and that the company felt that the vehicles available for his use at the office were perfectly
satisfactory and that, in fact, other employees used those
rehicles and did an effective job (R I87).
There was no requirement as to the size, age or
condition of the automobile that Mr. Lundberg used
(R159), in fact, one of his supervisors, on many occasions, discussed with him his using the company's cars
(R18I-I82). The deceased on many occasions asked
the company to furnish him an automobile for his own
use twenty-£our hours a day and was refused (RI 79).
The Appellants contend that on the date of the
decedent's death, he had left his home at a time earlier
than usual to in order to arrive at the company off ice
for an 8 a.m. meeting. However, the undisputed testimony is that it was not unusual to have an 8 o'clock
meeting at the company offices and that 8 o'clock was
the normal beginning time for the work day (RI74).
Eight o'clock meetings at the office with Mr. Lundberg
were held continually (R191). Insofar as the Appel!ant's assumption that the decedent was taking a route
to work that morning other than his normal route, is
based upon testimony of his son who rode to work with
the decedent while he was employed by the employer
for about a month and a half in the summer of I965 and
is solely an assumption (RI 71-172).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE REVIEWING COURT MUST AF
FIRM THE COMMISSION'S DECISION GX
LESS THERE IS CREDIBLE EVIDENCI
'"7"1THOUT SUBSTANTIAL CONTRADIC.'
TION \VHICH POINTS SO CLEARLY Al\'D
PERSUASIVELY IN CLAIMANT'S FA\'OR
THAT FAILURE TO MAKE A'VARD
'VOULD JUSTIFY CONCLUSION THAT
THE COMMISSION ACTED ERRONEOUSLY.
ARBITRARILY OR UNREASONABLY IJ
DISREGARDING OR REFUSING TO BK
LIEVE THE EVIDENCE.

I

Section 35-1-85, UCA (1953) reads in part as fol.
lows:
"After each formal hearing it shall be the duty
of the Commission to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law in writing and file the same
with its secretary. The findings and conclusions
of the Commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final and shall not be subject to
review; such questions of fact shall include ulti·
mate facts and the findings and conclusions of
the Commission. . . "
There has been a multitude of cases that have fol·
lowed from and interpreted the above quoted statute.
This point No. I is found in and was taken from Vause
vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 17 Utah 2nd, 217.
407 Pac. 2nd 1006 ( 1965). This case, as with the whol.e
line of cases preceding it and those which followed it
6

affirm the position that the reviewing court must affirm
the Commission's decision unless the evidence, without
.111bstantial contradiction, clearly points to the conclu1ion that the Commission in failing to give an award to
the applicant acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unreasonably in disregarding or refusing to believe that evidence.
The cases found in the footnotes to Section 35-1-85
cited clearly point out the same rule. No further
r·itations need be given as this point of law is so well
established.
It should also be noted in the Vause case (supra)
that the reviewing court must look at the record and the
eri<lence before it in the light most favorable to the
Industrial Commission's finding. It was there said at
page 1007 as follows :

"Our statutory and decisional law require us to
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commission's finding and it is the obligation of the
parties involved to so present the matter to the court."
Thus, if evidence is present in the instant case to
support the fin dings of the Commission, even though
contradicted or in conflict, the court must find in favor
of the defendants and against the plaintiff and affirm
the decision of the Industrial Commission.

POINT II
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
To SUPPORT THE COMMISSION'S FINDIXG OF FACT AND ITS CONCLUSION OF

7

LA 'V THAT THE DEATH 011-. DECEDE:\.
DID NOT .ARISE OUT OF HIS El\ll'L01_MEN'l' OR 'VITHIN THE COUHSE OF Ht
It would appear that the sole issue in this case :whether or not the decedent, Leo L. Lundberg, did.
as the result of an accident that occurred iu the cour.1•
of or arising out of his employment. The Commissio11.
both in the original order and in the order after tht
matter was reopened found as follows:

"The Heariug Examiner finds that the ust
of the car was essential to the day to day busine" I
of the deceased. However, no finding can bt
made that it was rcq uircd. The e\·idence sham
that there were, in fact, company cars available
for day to day use of the deceased, if he so de·
sired." ( R.206).
"However, it must also be noted that the ern·
ployed had available at all times a compan,1
owned vehicle that could be used by the deceased
at no cost to him. Granted, the vehicles were 111
remain on the premises after closing hours, but
there is nothing to indicate that these would nor
be available during the day . . .
The record is clear also that the fatal injury
occurred in the morning while the applicant wm
'on the way to work'. It did not happen after
hours, during the entertainment of customer.s.
or on an emergency call or any other time !II
which the car would be used for the exceptional
use rather than the use of going to work ...
The Hearing Examiner agrees that the real
issue becomes one of 'wa:> the employee perform·

8

ing a substantial function or special missions for
the employer ( The Hearing Examiner believes
he was not at the time of the accident. The only
mission apparent was the physical transportation
of himself to the place of business." ( R232).
"Giving the most liberal possible interpretation to the facts, the Hearing Examiner must
conclude that the 'going to and coming from'
work exception in the compensation law was in
effect at the time of the fatal accident to the
decedent." ( R233) .
The evidence upon which the above quoted findings was made is very clear. His direct supervisor,
Winston J. Fillmore, testifies upon his deposition as
follows:
On direct examination by appellant's attorney:

Q. "'Vas there other transportation available he
could have used?"
A. "'Ve have trucks that are there he could have
used. That means more of a sedan delivery
type. 'Ve did have some available Volkswagons that were there for salesmen that
he could have used."
Q. "'Vas he ever requested to use these vehicles
rather than his own private automobile?"

A. "I don't think I ever requested him to use
them".
Q. "'Vould you have expected him to have used
these automobiles rather than his own private automobile?"
A. "I think that was up to him to make that decision".
9

Q. "Say, for example, he was going out fu 1

grand opening or a special event in whiet
it was quite a well known fact that he wa
going to use this particular automobile 11 ,.
transporting a customer or client. 'Voukl \'(11
have wanted him to make this
i1.
a Y olkswagon ?"
·
1

A. "That would have been perfectly all right'
with us. 'Ve have other people doing similai
work using similar automobiles. It would hm1
made no difference to us what he would hm'.
used." ( R19-20).

Vear L. Jensen, another supervisor of the decedent
stated in response to questions by the defendant's attorney at the original hearing in this matter as follom ..
Q. "Now, was there an extra vehicle arnilaLl1
at the office at the time of ].\fr.
death? That is, I'm talking about the montl,
preceding or for some period of time pre
ceding that? 'Vas there an extra vchkk
available there for him for his use t

A. "'Ve had two Y olkswagons and there wa1
also a panel truck that were used by super·
visory people."
Q. "'Vas it available for his use?"

A. "Yes." (R156)
The above quoted testimony in both instances
absolutely uncontradicted and points out clearly the
fact that the decedent was not required by the employer
to furnish his own automobile for use in the course o\
his employment but that other vehicles were availabl:
to him to be used at any time he wished to avail himself

10

'Ii' them. There had been a conversation on several

Ol'.-

1·asio11s between the decedent and his supervisor, \Viii\\0;1 .J. Filmore, regarding his use of a company car.
.1lr. Filmore testified that he had talked with the de' ceclent many times about his using the company car during the day and leaving it at the company office at night.
:1lr. Filmore further testified that was the reason the
automobiles had been purchased and were at the company office and that they were available for cfacedent's
Lise (R 181-182).

Thus it can clearly be seen that there was no re11uirement that the decedent bring his car to ·work for
his use during the course of a day, and there is no evidence of any requirement or contractual arrangement
Ltlween the employer and the decedent to haYe the car
arnilable during the course of any given day. The mileage records prepared by the decedent which were used
for the purpose of paying him his mileage and other
out-of-pocket expense, are a part of the record herein
and show a uniform exclusion of between 13 and liJ
llliles from the close of one day to the morning of the
11ext day. (R 150-151). At the original hearing of
this matter, Mr. Vear L. Jensen produced these records
m<l testified that he found no evidence of any mileage
being charged at night from an examination of those
records ( R 152). Thus, by inference, it can be conduded that the decedent, himself, did not think tlat
he h;1d any obligation to bring his automobile to the employer's place of business each and every day of hi3
tlll;;loyment. Had he felt such an obligation, he would
kl\e charged mileage for the bringing of the automo' l1ilt. The Appellant's have stressed the need of the de-

ll

cedent to have an automobile during the course of h
work day. It is admitted that an automobile was rt·
quired to perform the work that the decedent \Vas e11.
gaged in. However, it should be noted that decedent
spent approximately 50 percent of his working time
the company office and was out of the off ice approxi
mately the other 50 percent of the time (R 47, 162 1
It is also a fair conclusion to be drawn from the evidence
that some of the time when he was out of the office, he
was not
engaged in company business and definitely not engaged in business of which the compam
approved. His supervisor, Mr. Filmore, testified 0;1'
cross-examination by plaintiff's attorney, as follows:
1

111

Q. "Leo was never criticized for not spending
enough time doing company work, was he(
A. "Yes, he was criticized many times for no!
spending more time there. He was criticizerl
for spending time on the golf course.'
(R 186)
Thus, it can fairly be said from the evidence in the
record that not all of the time that the decedent
away from the company office was he engaged in the
company's business and on business of which the com·
pany approved. This would tend to reduce even more
the percentage of use of the vehicle in the course of his
employment.
The Appelant's have cited numerous cases in their
brief by which they hope to persuade the Court that the
Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that the
death of the decedent did not arise out of or in the count
of his employment. However, the Appellant's have in·

12

uieil strained i:1e interpretation of the cases they !m \ c
if the cases were fairly quoted in
s
l1rieL, they, i11 fact, would support the position 01' L:.:
lumm1ssion. There are two Utah cases that are most
1tcl'llt: G. lJ. ·JIoscr vs. Industrial Commission of
i111h, ct al, 21Utah2nd 51, 440 Pac. 2nd 23 (1908),
' ,111d Jiuile.IJ vs. Utah State Industrial Commission, 16
rt ah
:208, 398 Pac. 2nd 545 ( 1965) . Both are distinguishable from the facts that we presently ha Ye uwlcr
1ousickration. In the Bailey case the decedent
,,
11·rril'.c station operator and was self-employed. TLu.,,
he was both employer and employee under the Y/ (,1,: 111en 's Compensation Act. His death occurred 01:e rn.or11111g \1 hile driving an automobile registered in his namt:
1q lite service station that he operated. The court held
that in this instance, Bailey as the employee, was performing a substantial service for Bailey as the employer in bringing the car to work and thus, fit into an ex1rpiion to the going an coming rule. HoweYer, the
rnurt based its decision upon the facts of that case
11hieh revealed that the station wagon was used for
1nwrgency calls at all hours and carried in it necessary
lnrils and implements to service or repair customer's
;111lomobiles. The decedent, in that case, also permitted
to use the car while their cars were being sen'1ced at the decedent's service station. The decedent ia
Le Bailey case also carried the station wagon upon the
liooks as a business asset and the oil and gas which it
11sc·d 11 as charged as a business expense.
dLu and

1

Thus, in effect, the car in question in the Bailey
·,e 11 as a company car and the cases are quite clear that
11l1«u ait employee is driving a company car to work for

'

1
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use by the company, the employee is covered uude1
Workmen's Compensation. In the Bailey case the auto
mobile was used primarily for the benefit of tbe business. Others were allowed to drive it and it was co11sidered as business property by Bailey.

In the instant case before the court, Lundberg wa1
the exclusive user of his automobile and the car was i11
no way company property. As is noted previously in
this brief, the automobile was not driven to the compam
office for use by the company, but only as a means 111
transportation by the decedent to the company of fict
because from that point on during the course of the day '.
other vehicles were available for the decedent's use
Thus, there was no requirement that the Lundberg
automobile be brought to the company place of business \
for the company's use.
!
1

1

In the most recent Utah case, G. B. Moser vs. /11dustrial Commission of Utah, et al, (Supra), it is clearly
shown that more is needed to come within an exceptio11
to the going and coming from rule than merely driving
one's car to work for the convenience of oneself. In the
Moser case the plaintiff was injured while trying to start
a truck and drive it to his employer's place of business
As stated by the decision in that case:
"Under their arrangement, the plaintiff owned
the truck but leased it to the company by an
agreement which gives the latter the full right
of possession, use and control of it."
Under these circumstances, the court granted relief
emphasizing the effect of the lease agreement and say·
ing as follows:

14

"Inasmuch as under the lease the truck was
committed to be used in defendant's business
with the full right of possession and control, the
effect as related to the issue here is the same as
if the truck belonged to the company, and it
makes no difference who the owner was. Though
it was parked in a lot near the plaintiff's home,
in order to continue its function in the def endant' s business it was necessary that someone
take it down to the defendant's terminal."
This obviously is not the situation in the case at bar
, there being no contractual obligation of the decede21t
lo bring his automobile to the place of employment for
the use of the employer in the employer's business. .L1
the l\1oser case, it appeared that the court felt it \YJ.s
perhaps reaching the outer limits of recovery and felt
that further facts other than the lease agreement may
lie needed to justify granting recovery therein and the
court said as follows:
"Coupled with the above are the further significant facts that the problem of the truck stalling had been reported to the manager; and that
he had given directions to the plaintiff who was
in the process of carrying this out when he was
injured."
The Appellant's cite the Davis vs. Bjorenson, :298
X.W. 829, Iowa, (1940). However, this case can be
rliffcrentiated from the present facts on the same basis
tlrnt the Bailey case can be differentiated; to wit, the
employee was required to bring the automobile to work
i11 the morning by his employer for the use by the company. In the Davis case the automobile for all intents

15

and purposes was treated as a company car and wui
used as such. The following quotation makes it ven
clear that the situation in Davis is very different fro 1;1
the facts presently at bar:

"Under the employment agreement, the claim.
ant regularly furnished his automobile to the
employer for the use in the business as a service
car. At night the car was kept at the
home where he was subject to emergency service
calls requiring its use. During regular working
hours the car was kept at the employer's place
of business for use in the business, not only by
the claimant,, but also by the employer and by
other employees. Thus the car was an instrumentality of the business at all hours of the day and •
was subject to that use at night. ... It was his
duty and this duty was regular and definite, to
take the automobile to the employer's shop for
its use in the business, by others as well as claim· ·
ant. In so doing, he was performing for his em·
ployer a substantial service required by his em·
ployment at the place and in the manner so re·.
quired. In the language of the able trial court,
'claimant had no selection of his mode of travel
to work, that he was required under the terms of
his contract to drive his own car from his home
to the shop where it was available to his em·
ployer for use in the employer's business.'" (Em·
phasis added)
1

I

The Appellants dte King vs. State Industrial Ac·
cident Commission, 211 Or. 40, 315 Pac. 2nd, 148, Ore·
gon (1957), as being directly in point. However, in that
case, the employee was killed while riding in his own boat
across a bay in order to aid in the construction of a log

16

boom. The decedent and other employees would drive, or

by other means, arrive at the dock on the edge of the
bay. From there they had to cross a two mile bay to reach

the site of construction. The employer furnished a boat
for the use of the employees but on this particular occa1ion, the decedent used his own boat and took along with
him three other men who were employees of the employer. The Appellants, in their brief, at page 12 state as
follows:
"His employer, who had no contractual obligation to provide transportation to the place of
employment, had, nevertheless, made available
a company owned boat for use of the employees
in transporting themselves to the place of employment and then for their use in the duties of
constructing the log boom."
The opinion in this case i)tates at page 154, Supra,
as follows which is clearly contrary to the statement
that the Appellants have inserted their brief:
"We believe that the record warrants a belief,
as we have stated before, that the employers
were under an implied obligation to furnish a
means whereby the men could cross the bay. In
short, they rendered the tugboat available to the
men as an incident of the contract of employment. (Emphasis added)
Thus, it can clearly be seen that the employer had
provided transportation from the edge of the bay whicl1
would be the point at which the employees arrived at
their place of employment to the log boom that they
were working on. In this particular case, the decedent,

17

in effect, had arrived at work and was using his 011 11
boat directly in the employer's
In the case ar:
bar the accident occurred, and the Commission so fouuJ.
prior to the time that the Appellant had arrived at hi,
place of employment. Appellants also cite Jones :··.,
Texas Indemnity Insurance Company, Texas Civil Ap·
peal, 223 South West 2nd, 286, ( 1961). Which case
can be readily distinguished. In that case Jones wa1
required to use his own car on the job and drive it from
place to place servicing household equipment. He 1'::11
reimbursed for these trips, including his trips to work. .
He also transported all of the company tools which ht
used in performance service for the employer in the car
and was doing so at the time of the accident. In that :
case the court stated as follows:

"In the case we have here, the employee, Jones
was at the time of his injury, engaged in the per·
formance of the duty of his employment. He was
doing what his contract of employment either
expressly authorized him to do or required him
to do. He was driving the automobile from a1
place he had taken same in the authorized prose·
cution of his employer's business to be further
used in the prosecut.ion of that business at an·
other place ... " (Emphasis added)

1

1

The last major case cited in the Appellant's brief
is Smith vs. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
447 Pac. 2nd, 365, 73 Cal. Reports 253, ( 1968). The
Appellants representation of this case is erroneous and
in fact, is directly contrary to what the case holds. 111
this case the decedent worked for the county as a
worker and was killed on his way to work one morning

18

The major issue upon which the decisions of both ,:_...:
Commission and the Court were based was whether lie
1:ould use the county car on the job. The Appelian:u
state at page 14 of their brief:
"The county had cars available for the use of
the social workers, however,J'he deceased had
never availed himself of their use, although he
had discretion in that regard."
This is clearly contrary to the
findings. The
Commission found that substantial evidence indicateli
that county cars were available for Smith's use durmg
the day and based their denial of recovery on this ev1<lence. The Commission in the Smith case as the Comdid in the present case before the bar reasoned
that since these automobiles were available for the employee's use, he was not required to drive his own car
and thus he was subject to the going and coming rule.
The court, in the Smith case in granting the recovery
based its holdings strictly on it.s own determination
Smith was required to furnish his own car and could
use the county car. That this is true under the facts of
that particular case is supported by the following quotations:
On page 369 of the opinion the court states:
"Hence the employer's requirement that the
worker furnish a vehicle of transportation on the
job curtails the application of the going and
coming exclusion."
On page 370:
"Surely in this day of a highly motorized society we cannot cast the going and coming rule as
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a protective covering over the shoulders of tn1Jea
employer who, for his own advantage, demana10ut
that the employer furnish the car on the job . 1
(Emphasis added)
rto
It is thus quite clear that the court in the Smitl
ca_se determined that it was demanded by the employu
or required by the employer that a vehicle be furnisheu
by the employee. The Commission, in the instant cast!
found quite to the contrary; to wit, that no requiremen::
that an automobile be furnished could be found fro1u
the evidence. Under the general rule regarding tht
Findings of Fact being exclusively the province of tht
Commission and under the substantial evidence supporting that finding the decision of the Commission musl
be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
There is substantial evidence to support the Fin<l·
ings of Fact of the Commission, some disputed and some
not disputed, but in either event, the findings drawn
from said evidence are reasonable. 'Vith the Findingi
of Fact being reasonable and based upon substantinl
evidence, the Conclusion of Law drawn therefrom is thr
only conclusion that could be reached; to wit, that th''
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tbdeath of the decedent, Leo L. Lundberg, did not arise
na, 011 t of or in the course of his employment and the deci-
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of the Commission should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON &
TAYLOR
By: Richard H. Moffat
1311 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Federated Dairy
Farms, Inc. and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company
VERNON G. ROMNEY

Attorney General of the State
of Utah and Attorney for Industrial Com1nission of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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